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Rights-Based Reasoning in Discussions about Lesbian and Gay Issues:
Implications for Moral Educators
Abstract
Despite a paucity of psychological research exploring the interface between lesbian
and gay issues and human rights, a human rights framework has been widely
adopted in debates to gain equality for lesbians and gay men. Given this prominence
within political discourse of human rights as a framework for the promotion of positive
social change for lesbians and gay men, the aim of this study was to explore the
extent to which rights-based arguments are employed when talking about lesbian
and gay issues in a social context. An analysis of six focus group discussions with
students showed that when lesbian and gay issues are discussed, rights-based
reasoning is employed intermittently, and in relation to certain issues more so than
others. The implications of these findings for moral education aimed at promoting
positive social change for lesbians and gay men are discussed.
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Rights-Based Reasoning in Discussions about Lesbian and Gay Issues:
Implications for Moral Educators
Human rights are "the rights of all people, at all times and in all situations" (Cranston,
1962, p.49). A human rights approach to lesbian and gay issues takes as its starting
point the fundamental principle that human rights are universal and inalienable
comprising first and foremost the right to life and secondly any rights which maintain
the existence and quality of that life (e.g. civil, social and economic rights) for all
people regardless of class, race, sex, sexual orientation, religion and disability
(Donnelly, 1993). Consequently, whether or not embodied in laws, treaties and
declarations, human rights apply to all people, including lesbians and gay men.
Psychological theory and research on moral reasoning has engaged
implicitly with human rights, with human rights occupying a small but key position
in moral developmental theory. For example, within Kohlberg's stage theory of
moral development, human rights are embedded at the sixth, and highest, stage
of reasoning, characterised by "universal principles of justice: the equality of
human rights and respect for the dignity of human beings" justified in terms of a
"belief as a rational person in the validity of universal moral principles and a sense
of personal commitment to them" (Kohlberg, 1984, pp. 174-6). Therefore, within a
Kohlbergian framework, reasoning based on human rights is considered the most
advanced, and thus most desirable, form of reasoning and the benchmark by
which earlier stages of reasoning are evaluated (Carter, 1987).
Arising from Kohlberg’s theory is a well established body of empirical
research, but for the most part, these studies appear not to have engaged with
the human rights aspect of the model. This is probably due, at least in part, to the
fact that in most studies, few (if any) participants have been found to reason at
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stage six (see Kohlberg, 1984; Kohlberg et al., 1983). Despite neo-Kohlbergian
work being well-established in the psychological literature, it has also been
heavily critiqued (for a summary, see Kohlberg et al., 1983). In particular, it has
been considered andro- and ethno-centric (e.g. see Gilligan, 1982; Kurtines &
Gewirtz, 1987; Sampson, 1988) and has been criticised for a failure in empirical
research to demonstrate sequential progression through the stages (e.g. see
Carter, 1987). However, these arguments primarily attend to the structure
inherent to the model, rather than to the types of arguments encapsulated within
it.
Leaving aside the issue of whether (human) rights based reasoning is,
psychologically, the most ‘developed‘ or ‘sophisticated’ moral standpoint, a
human rights approach has been seen as tremendously powerful in the political
arena for effecting positive social change. By locating sexual orientation within a
human rights framework, lesbians and gay men (and their advocates) can link
their struggle to a tradition which has transformed the oppression of other groups
(e.g. women and blacks) into rights respected under domestic and international
law (Helfer & Miller, 1996). Other moral frameworks, however, make it difficult to
achieve equality for lesbians and gay men because they construct sexual
orientation as 'private practice', rather than 'public identity' and therefore not as a
social and legal issue. Furthermore, since human rights apply to all people,
independent of individual differences (e.g. race, class, sex, sexual orientation,
and religion) (Donnelley, 1993) and are founded on the principle of equality, they
are widely supported in principle (e.g. see Ellis, 2002b; Ellis et al., 2002). It
therefore makes sense to focus on, and promote, this type of reasoning as an
appropriate framework for thinking about lesbian and gay issues.
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Furthermore, a human rights framework has been successfully used to
secure equality for lesbians and gay men in recent political debates. For example,
in the UK, the various campaigns (1994, 1998, 1999, 2000) for equalising the age
of consent for sex between men with that for heterosex (like the campaigns to
remove the ban on lesbians and gays in the military; the removal of Section 28 of
the Local Government Act [1]; and other debates) have primarily been based on
the human rights argument of equality, or equal rights for all (see Ellis & Kitzinger,
2002). In these campaigns, both Civil rights organisations and MPs have been
united in arguing for human rights: "the case for equality" (Stonewall, 1998);
"Outrage! backs equality at 16" (Outrage!, 1999); "The debate is about equality",
"it is a bill about human rights and equality under the law" (Lord Warner, House of
Lords); "it is not an issue for gay men alone…but one of human rights" (Edwina
Currie, House of Commons) (extracts from Hansard). It would appear then, that in
a moral democratic society, a human rights framework is advantageous for
promoting equality for lesbians and gay men.
Whilst a human rights approach has been employed in a number of
relatively recent psychological studies around social issues such as state-
sponsored violence (Lykes et al., 1993), domestic violence (Perilla, 1999; Beasley
& Thomas, 1995), incest (e.g. Russell, 1995), and transracial adoption (e.g. Penn
& Coverdale, 1996), this approach has seldom been applied to issues of
discrimination against lesbians and gay men. Likewise, studies which explore
attitudes towards, understandings of, and support for human rights (Doise et al.,
1999; Moghaddam & Vuksanovic, 1990; Payaslyoðlu & Içduygu, 1999; Ruck et
al., 1998); as well as those which explore willingness to extend human rights to
various groups within society (e.g. Owen & Dennis, 1987; Sotelo, 2000a), with
only a small number of exceptions (e.g. Ellis, 2002b; Ellis et al., 2002; Sotelo,
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2000b), have seldom explored attitudes towards, and willingness to extend,
human rights to lesbians and gay men.
However, studies which have explored lesbian and gay issues as human
rights issues have been primarily survey-based, and therefore do not explore
whether people use human rights frameworks to discuss lesbian and gay issues.
For example, using the support for lesbian and gay rights questionnaire, Ellis
(2002b) and Ellis et al (2002) explored the extent to which people supported
specific human rights issues as they apply to lesbians and gay men. Respondents
were asked to indicate on a 5-point likert-type scale the extent to which they
agreed with each of a series of human rights issues (e.g. "Lesbian and gay
couples should have all the same parenting rights as heterosexuals do", "There is
never a situation in which someone's homosexuality should be a cause for job
discrimination"). Findings of this study showed that whilst 96% of respondents
supported the notion that human rights should apply to all people, when asked
about specific human rights issues, levels of support varied considerably. Whilst
these studies suggested that social rights (e.g. the right to marry and found a
family; the right to be fairly represented in education) were much less well
supported than other rights (e.g. freedom from fear; employment rights), Sotelo
(2000) found that adolescents were much less willing to extend rights relating to
public activities (e.g. demonstrations).
Although several papers (e.g. Petrovic, 1999; Reiss, 1997, 1999) have
discussed moral education in relation to homosexuality, to date only one study
(Ellis, 2002a) has explored moral reasoning in relation to lesbian and gay rights
issues. In this study, moral reasoning about homosexuality was measured using a
version of the Moral Judgement Test (Lind and Wakenhut, 1985) modified so that
the vignettes specifically focused on lesbian and gay issues. The findings of this
7study showed that respondents favoured human rights (stage 6) arguments less
than they favoured other types of reasoning (i.e. individualism, legal duty, and
relativism). However, what this study does not explore is the circumstances under
which people do employ human rights reasoning.
Given the prominence of human rights as a framework for the promotion of
positive social change for lesbians and gay men within political discourse, the aim of
this study was to explore the extent to which people (in this case students) employ
human rights arguments when talking about lesbian and gay issues in a social
context, and when this type of reasoning occurs. This study therefore differs from, but
builds on previous work on moral reasoning in relation to lesbian and gay issues (i.e.
Ellis, 2002a) in that it explores reasoning in a social context, through discussion,
rather than via the more structured and formal means of psychometric testing of
moral reasoning. Although small-scale, it was expected that by investigating the
extent to which rights-based reasoning is employed in social discourse around
lesbian and gay rights issues, we (as moral educators) might gain some insight into
how best to work towards facilitating positive social change for lesbians and gay men
(cf. Payaslyoðlu & Içduygu, 1999).
The Study
Data Collection
Facilitated by myself, six group discussions, each lasting an hour to an hour and a
half, were conducted with students at a university in the East Midlands, England.
Potential participants for the study were recruited through colleagues and
acquaintances of the researcher, from classes within the Social Sciences
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department, and via e-mail to student organisations and societies within the
university. Participation in the study was voluntary, however, I endeavoured to recruit
participants from as wider range of subject areas, levels of study, and ages, as
possible. Students within each group were acquainted with one another, and one
group (group 6) was specifically recruited because all members identified as lesbian
or gay (This group was recruited through the university’s LGBT student group).
Unfortunately, despite attempts to include participants from ethnic minority
backgrounds the sample comprised exclusively white participants. Overall, the final
sample of participants comprised 18 participants (6 male; 12 female), most of whom
self-identified as heterosexual, and represented a range of subject areas (see Table I
for a demographic breakdown of participants by discussion group).
[insert table I about here]
Although the present sample was one of convenience, and therefore non-
representative, this was seen as relatively unproblematic in that the intent of study
was to explore reasoning within a localised context (i.e. within discussion) rather than
to determine generalised patterns of reasoning.
Focus groups, rather than individual interviews, were employed in this study to
investigate human rights talk within a social context; which is, of course, the setting
within which negotiation about rights and rhetoric around prejudice is typically
developed. All discussions were carried out in a room at the university, were tape-
recorded and subsequently transcribed. The discussions were semi-structured, in
that they were conducted for a larger study exploring student reasoning about lesbian
and gay (human) rights issues. A schedule was therefore created for the discussions
which introduced a sequence of specific rights issues – freedom of expression,
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same-sex marriage, lesbian and gay parenting, lesbian and gay issues in education,
employment issues, age of consent, and state sanctioned violence – around which
the discussions were based. The schedule focused primarily on social rights as these
were identified as salient in my previous study on support for lesbian and gay human
rights (Ellis, 2002b). Each topic was introduced into the discussion by a leading
question, and was followed by a series of probe questions designed to explore
participants’ reasoning further. For example, in order to initiate discussion about the
right of lesbians and gay men to marry, each group was asked "what do you think
about same-sex marriage?" As the discussions developed, probe questions such as
“do you think that lesbian and gay couples should be able to get married?” and “what
if they want to make a public affirmation of their love for religious or other reasons?”
were introduced to gain as much depth as possible on each topic. Structuring the
lead questions in this way may have cued participants into taking a particular stance
on the issues (most likely to conform to an anti-discrimination norm), however, I was
not perturbed about this as I was primarily interested in the extent to which
participants employed rights-based reasoning and not whether they purported to
agree or disagree with the issues being raised.
Following the lead question for each issue the discussions were left to take
their own direction and focus until conversation was exhausted at which point a new
topic was introduced. In order to ensure that each topic was fully exhausted before
moving on, the probe questions were initiated by myself at points where the
discussion appeared to be waning. Since the focus of the study was on the extent to
which rights-based reasoning was invoked, I deliberately ensured that none of my
topic-based questions specifically mentioned rights or equality.
After discussion of the seven topic areas, I explicitly introduced the notion of
human rights by asking “Have you heard of the phrase human rights?” followed by
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the question “do you have any idea what it means?” When discussion of human
rights appeared exhausted, I then introduced the idea of human rights being applied
to lesbian and gay issues by asking “Do you think it [human rights] might be relevant
to thinking about lesbian and gay issues?” and encouraged participants to elaborate
on their responses.
Although a series of probe questions was prepared in advance, discussions
were allowed to unfold naturally, and thus the probe questions used attended to the
standpoints which emerged in the discussion, as well as potential counterarguments
common in lay discourse on lesbian and gay issues. The schedule was, therefore,
used as a guide rather than a definitive structure for the discussions. A copy of the
schedule topics and questions (in the order they were introduced) is included as an
appendix to this paper.
Data Analysis
Analyses of the focus group data presented here involved the drawing together of
similar themes or discourses as is customary in qualitative social science research.
The form of analysis used in this study may be characterised as content-cum-
thematic analysis whereby drawing on Potter & Wetherell's (1987) guidelines (see
pp. 167-171), incidences of rights-based reasoning within the discussions as a whole
(i.e. across topics) were identified by reading through of each of the transcripts a
number of times. As part of the analysis in its entirely, incidences of other types of
reasoning (e.g. rhetoric around care and ‘protection’ of children; moral probity;
majority rules) were also identified and coded into a number of themes.
In order to identify where rights-based reasoning was employed in the focus
group talk, it was necessary to derive a working definition of what rights-based talk
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would look like. It was initially anticipated that the Moral Judgement Interview (MJI),
an operational version of Kohlberg's stage theory of moral development might be of
use here. However, despite giving numerous examples of reasoning at stages one
through five, the manual for Kohlberg’s MJI (Colby & Kohlberg, 1987) does not give
any working examples of stage six (human rights) reasoning. Although Kohlberg
quotes some philosophical accounts of stage six reasoning (see Kohlberg, 1981, pp.
33-34 and p. 162) these, firstly, pertain to the right to life, and therefore do not give a
clear indication of what stage 6 reasoning might look like in relation to other issues,
and secondly, are too unwieldy to be useful as a model from which to judge everyday
discourse. Similarly, the representative examples incorporated into psychometric
tests of moral reasoning, such as the Defining Issues Test (DIT; see Rest, 1979) and
Moral Judgement Test (MJT; see Lind & Wakenhut, 1985) were also inadequate, due
to their conciseness. A new operational definition was therefore created for this study
as a guide to analysis.
The definition employed for the present analysis was based on the general
literature on human rights. Consistent with human rights theory, human rights were
defined as "the rights of all people, at all times, and in all situations" (Cranston, 1962,
p. 49), characterised as universal and egalitarian (i.e. they apply to all people
equally), indivisible (they cannot be separated from one another) and inalienable
(they cannot be taken away or foregone) (see Donnelly, 1993). However, lay
conceptions of concepts seldom comprise formal definitions or highly structured
‘official’ language. In relation to lesbian and gay issues then, it was expected that if
respondents were using human rights reasoning, they may be employing the
language of human rights, as just described, or they may be simply drawing on
human rights principles (e.g. the right to life as paramount over cultural
considerations; everyone having the right to live without fear).
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Consequently, a statement which drew on human rights concepts was, in the
present study, deemed to be human rights talk. So, for example, where a participant
referred to “equality for all people, regardless of sexual identity”, or that “all people
should have the right to marry”, this was deemed to be human rights talk, in that the
statement “all people” implies universality. Likewise, where a participant said, for
example, “lesbians and gay men should have the same rights as heterosexuals”, or
that “denying lesbians and gay men to serve in the military is the same as not
allowing blacks to serve in the military”, this too was deemed to be human rights talk,
in that it implicitly refers to equality. Therefore, in analysing the focus group data,
passages were selected where participants explicitly mentioned human rights (i.e.
“lesbians and gay men should be allowed to parent children, because it is a basic
human right to parent children”), or when this was implied by the use of human rights
language, such as universality and egalitarianism (i.e. “lesbians and gay men should
be afforded partner rights as a matter of equality”).
To analyse the data then, I read through each transcript systematically coding
the arguments presented by participants. Each time a statement conformed to the
criteria outlined here, it was labelled ‘human rights’. Other types of reasoning were
identified and labelled using a similar process, but as the focus of this paper is on
human rights reasoning in relation to lesbian and gay issues, these are not discussed
here (see Ellis & Kitzinger, 2002 for an analysis of non-rights-based arguments
typically invoked in rhetoric around lesbian and gay issues).
Human rights in focus group talk
An analysis of the transcripts from all six focus groups showed that to some degree
focus group participants did use the language of human rights when discussing
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lesbian and gay issues, although the phrase ‘human rights’ itself was used
infrequently. Consequently, the implicit use of human rights arguments were more
common than explicit references.
Whilst the discussion of most issues invoked brief reference to human rights, a
human rights perspective was most evident in relation to state sanctioned violence
against lesbians and gay men (e.g. imprisonment, torture, or death, simply for being
lesbian or gay), a human rights framework being employed by most participants to
suggest that these actions should not occur. For example, “I don’t think they have the
right as humans to kill other humans” (Katherine); “it’s human rights at the end of the
day” (Rita); “we go into places like Kosovo and stuff like that for basic human rights
… why can’t we do that for gay people?” (Wendy); and it’s “human rights basically”
(Tim).
Similarly, when the concept of human rights was explicitly introduced in
relation to lesbian and gay issues, several participants explicitly discussed the
interface between lesbian and gay issues and human rights. For example, the
following excerpt shows Rita employing a human rights framework to indicate support
for lesbian and gay issues as human rights issues:
Facilitator: Do you think that the concept of human rights might be relevant to thinking
about lesbian and gay issues? If so, how, if not, why not?
Pam: If persecution in other countries because of their sexuality, yeah, it’s a
human right issue.
Rita: And in this country I think it is as well. You know in any culture - I mean, it’s
not equal now, for gay and lesbians compared to heterosexuals, and I think
that is a human right really, that they should have the right of anybody else
walking on this earth, they should have just as much right. So, yeah, I think
it is a human rights issue.
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In this excerpt, I introduce the notion of human rights in relation to lesbian and gay
issues, to which Pam responds that she thinks persecution in other countries on
grounds of sexuality is a human rights issue. Rita then adds “in this country… as
well” and “in any culture” (human rights are universal), pointing out that lesbians and
gay men do not have equality with heterosexuals (human rights are egalitarian), and
that lesbians and gay men should have the same rights as “anybody else walking on
this earth” (human rights apply to all people everywhere).
Likewise, in response to the same question, Bryan indicated support for the
notion of lesbian and gay issues as human rights issues, as illustrated in the
following excerpt:
Bryan: Right. But whether you know issues surrounding sexuality have been
elevated to that of human rights, and they haven’t – they certainly haven’t
it’s usually based on religious or um ethnic persecution, human rights.
Facilitator: Do you think they should be elevated to that?
Bryan: Absolutely, absolutely. I mean it’s like Adam said, you’re talking about
issues that are related fundamentally to you know, people have the right to
be free of fear of discrimination, persecution, and for what – and for the
issues that that encompasses, I mean that should be taken very seriously.
Here, Bryan first points out that lesbian and gay issues have not typically been
considered human rights issues. However, when asked whether he thinks they
should be, he gives his unequivocal support (“absolutely”), going on to use the
central tenet of human rights – albeit his own version – to justify his stance (“[all]
people have the right to be free of fear of discrimination”).
Fiona also employs a human rights perspective, but in this case when
discussing lesbian and gay marches. She says
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Homophobic people are, I think, worsened by that kind of behaviour, not because
I think they shouldn’t have freedom of speech, because I think everybody should,
but just because I am not entirely sure that it’s not saying “look. Here we are, and
we’re different, and you have to accept us”.
Fiona introduces a human rights principle (“freedom of speech”) attending to
egalitarianism (“I think everybody should”). Although in this excerpt Fiona is
actually disagreeing with the right of lesbians and gay men to freedom of
expression, later in the focus group she revisits this issue during a discussion
of Section 28, and retracts her previous stance in light of her newly found
awareness of “these ridiculous rules that still exist”.
Congruent with this, the notion of equal rights, or equality for all, was
frequently invoked. For example, in connection with same-sex marriage, Fiona
claimed “it’s just another question of equal rights”, Katherine that “it’s a difference
[sic] of equal rights”, and Tim that “the same rules should be applied to both”.
Likewise, in relation to the age of consent, Diana stated “if you’re making everything
else equal, I can’t see any argument why the age of consent shouldn’t be equal as
well”, whilst Robert asserted “it should be equal, whatever age it is”.
The concept of equality was also alluded to where some participants claimed
that a lack of equality suggests that lesbians and gay men are somehow ‘less worthy’
of equal rights than heterosexual persons. For example, when discussing partner
benefits, Diana claimed that the existing inequalities “suggests that lesbian and gay
couples aren’t on the same level as heterosexuals, that they’re not worthy enough”.
Similarly, when discussing the age of consent for sex between men, Pam states “if
it’s a different age, it’s just saying that … it’s [being lesbian or gay is] not as good as
heterosexuals [sic]”.
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Another way in which the concept of human rights was raised, was through
the notion of universality, or that the issues (or rights) in question should apply to all
people, equally. For example, when discussing same-sex marriage, Adam stated “I
think one of the problems is that it’s got to be all or none. I don’t know whether or not
there’s any kind of justification for half measures” and that “it’s got to be either they’re
equivalent, or no law”. Similarly, when discussing employment rights, Katherine
suggests that rather than having universal laws, that lesbian and gay discrimination is
“a case of multiple laws” or “separate laws for different groups”, and likened it to “the
Jews being sent off into little ghettos” during the holocaust.
In discussing employment issues, the concept of human rights as universal
and egalitarian was invoked by participants often through the drawing of parallels
between discrimination against lesbians and gay men, and race discrimination. For
example, when discussing the ban on lesbians and gay men in the armed forces,
Imogen stated “you can’t take away somebody’s right to employment like that,
because of their sexuality”, going on to add that “it used to be that black people
weren’t accepted in the army”, and that “you can’t take away somebody’s right to
employment … because they’re blacks”. Likewise, when as moderator I introduced
the idea of lesbians and gay men being fired for being lesbian or gay, Rita stated “it’s
wrong” because “it’s just like being sacked because of your race”. Similarly, Tim
stated that firing someone on grounds of their sexual orientation is “just blatant
discrimination” and that “it’s like firing someone for race, you just don’t do it”.
In discussing other issues, some participants also employed rights-based talk
by invoking the notion of non-discrimination on grounds of characteristics such as
ethnicity and religion. For example, when discussing parenting rights, Imogen makes
a strong rights-based claim for lesbian and gay parenting:
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I think that anyone should – not have the right to have a child, because it isn’t a right, but
should have a chance to have their own children. And just because you happen to have a
certain kind of sexuality, doesn’t take away that you should have that chance, so anyone
should be able to have a chance to have their own child, whatever colour, sexuality,
whatever, they should be able to, and you shouldn’t be lumped with somebody else’s
child, but you shouldn’t have to adopt to have a child in your family.
Here, Imogen draws on the language of human rights by suggesting that the ‘chance’
to have a child should be afforded all people, irrespective of colour or sexuality.
Similarly, Adam suggests that the right to asylum should be extended to lesbians and
gay men in the same way as is afforded on the basis of religion, creed or ethnicity,
stating “if you’re having a policy of offering asylum to people who are being
discriminated on the basis of religion, ethnic what’s it, creed, sexuality, I mean – I am
sure it has to fit in under those – under the scope of those concepts”.
Finally, when discussing same-sex marriage, some participants employed
rights-based reasoning, referring to the benefits accrued by marriage and not
available to unmarried partners. For example, Tim stated “some married couples get
benefits on tax relief” and that “it would be nice to see gay couples recognised by the
government”, whilst Katherine said “I’m not as worried about the terminology, I think
the legal rights are more important”. Similarly, the following interchange between
Katherine and Leanne occurred when Leanne (a self-identified lesbian) puts forward
the idea of the (gay) ‘commitment ceremony’ as equivalent to (heterosexual)
marriage:
Leanne: In this country you can - you can do a commitment ceremony, which is -
isn’t a marriage but it’s the same level of commitment, it’s performed by a
priest and it can be - it can be a Christian ceremony, yeah, so it isn’t - it isn’t
called a marriage, because you can’t legally get married, but it is - it is a
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ceremony of commitment which says that “I am committed to you, and I
want to be with you for the rest of my life” and it is - it is a very similar
statement, so it - it isn’t a marriage because that’s not legal, but it is a very
similar ceremony saying very similar things, so
Katherine: It does the emotional
Leanne: It does have the same effect.
Katherine: It doesn’t cover the - It doesn’t cover if one of the couple falls ill then their
family gets the rights of choosing medical
Leanne: I’m not sure how it works, but there is - I don’t think it’s covered by the same
rules, because it’s not a marriage. It’s a very grey area, but it’s a
Gavin: sort of like a ( )
Leanne: yeah, and it’s things like - if, if you’re working for a company which has
health insurance, when it says it covers a spouse, a gay partner is not
covered because they’re not a spouse unless you’re married, and things
like that. So, it’s very difficult.
In response to Leanne’s suggestion that the commitment ceremony is “similar” to
marriage, Katherine introduces a rights-based approach by pointing out that although
a commitment ceremony does the same job in terms of the “emotional” aspect of
marriage, it does not extend the rights afforded by a legal marriage. Leanne then
backtracks on her claim, first claiming ignorance (“I’m not sure how it works”) going
on to adopt a rights-based approach herself, highlighting that partner benefits in the
workplace are only extended to a (legally defined) “spouse” and therefore are not
extended to lesbian and gay couples.
Implications for the Moral Educator
This study set out to explore the extent to which human rights arguments are
employed in conversation about lesbian and gay issues, with a view to establishing
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how we (as moral educators) might best work towards facilitating positive social
change for lesbians and gay men. The analysis presented her suggests that human
rights language and concepts were employed in a number of instances to argue for
positive social change for lesbians and gay men.
Overall, human rights arguments were used intermittently, interspersed with
arguments employed from other frameworks (e.g. personal preference; current social
frameworks). This, however, is not entirely surprising, in that a human rights
perspective is not the dominant framework used in public and psychological
discourse for talking about lesbian and gay issues. Until relatively recently, lesbian
and gay issues were not promoted as human rights issues in political and public
debate. Even though recent political debates in the UK (e.g. the Age of Consent;
Section 28; gays in the military) have been promoted as human rights issues, media
coverage has overwhelmingly focused on opposition to positive social change, which
as illustrated in my previous work (see Ellis & Kitzinger, 2002) has almost exclusively
comprised non-rights-based reasoning.
Arguing for lesbian and gay rights from within non-rights-based moral
frameworks is not an effective way of initiating positive social change for lesbians and
gay men, in that it evokes circular arguments. For example, to simply argue that
homosexuality is not morally wrong, sinful, etc simply evokes counterarguments that
it is. To do so is to adopt the agenda of those opposed to equality, an agenda in
which alternative moral frameworks are used to deflect attention from the issue of
equality (Dean, 1994).
Perhaps more importantly, though, It was noted that human rights arguments
were more often employed in relation to some issues rather than others: Notably it
occurred when issues around 'the right to life' and 'the right to asylum' were raised,
and were much less apparent in discussions of social rights (e.g. lesbian and gay
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parenting; same-sex marriage) and employment rights. This appears to reflect
participants’ limited perception of the range of issues legally and constitutionally
considered human rights issues. This is perhaps because the conception of human
rights as life-and-death issues (e.g. genocide; torture) is the ‘commonsense’ notion of
human rights promoted in the media and by (some) activist groups, and therefore an
easily accessible discourse of human rights. Whilst using human rights arguments in
relation to these issues is not in itself problematic, it implies too narrow a perception
of human rights. In teaching about human rights in moral education (at all levels) we
therefore need to develop a more comprehensive understanding of human rights,
and the breadth of issues that it covers.
The analysis presented here also clearly shows that when the notion of human
rights was explicitly introduced into the discussion, rights-based language became
more prevalent in discussions around lesbian and gay issues. It would seem then
that using a human rights framework as the focal point within which to raise lesbian
and gay issues might potentially encourage thought and discussion of lesbian and
gay issues as human rights issues. In moral education at secondary and higher
education, then, lesbian and gay issues (and potentially issues of other marginalised
groups) could be used as case examples. So rather than promoting lesbian and gay
issues as human rights issues, human rights education could be used to raise the
profile of lesbian and gay issues.
To this point, I have taken for granted that it is an appropriate aim for the
moral educator to facilitate positive social change for lesbians and gay men. As
Petrovic (1999) suggests it is not a question of ‘if’ but rather ‘how’ we do this.
Whether or not we as educators agree with homosexuality, from a human rights
perspective we have a duty to instil recognition of lesbians and gay men as equal in
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rights to all other human beings, in that moral education entails an obligation to
present a moral democratic stance.
Although in the present study there was an absence of outright challenges to
affording human rights to lesbians and gay men, many people do not see
homosexuality as a human rights issue. For example, they may see homosexuality
as morally sinful or see lesbians and gay men as ‘perverts’ and therefore less than
human: Frameworks which, in a sense, conflict with a human rights agenda. Whilst
those who expound these views may see them as legitimate moral arguments, from
a human rights framework they are particularly problematic. Firstly, human rights are
universal and therefore apply to all people; and as citizens in a moral democratic
society, all people have a moral obligation to ensure that the rights of all people,
including lesbians and gay men, are protected. Whilst a human rights framework
simultaneously entitles individuals to freely express their views (including views
against homosexuality) it often means supporting the rights of those whose actions,
behaviours and identities we do not necessarily agree with. Secondly, a human rights
framework clearly specifies that limitations may be put on people’s rights “for the
purpose of securing due recognition and respect for the rights and freedoms of
others” (United Nations, 1948). Therefore, whilst other standpoints can, and in my
opinion should, be discussed in the relatively ‘safe’ arena of moral education, people
are not entitled to use those views to infringe the rights of others e.g. lesbians and
gay men) through silencing views which conflict with their own. This is a key strength
of a human rights framework, and a point on which we can potentially engage those
morally opposed to homosexuality in constructive discussion.
Although small-scale, this study has shed some light on the extent to which
students employ human rights arguments in relation to lesbian and gay issues.
Despite the limitations of using a convenience sample (e.g. non-representative and
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potentially biased) the analysis reported here provides some insight into how we
might facilitate discussion of lesbian and gay issues as human rights issues. By
helping students to develop a broader conception of the scope of human rights, and
prioritising a human rights framework, we can facilitate the application of human
rights theory to real life issues, including those which apply to lesbians and gay men.
Above all, if we as moral educators value a human rights framework and wish
to promote it as a vehicle of social change, we need to encourage students to
explore, through discussion, the benefits of a human rights framework, and the
limitations of other frameworks for advancing positive social change. Prioritising a
human rights framework within moral education, therefore, can only help to
strengthen and promote its use in wider social discourse.
Word Count = 5985
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Notes
1 In the UK, Section 28 of the Local Government Act 1988 (the law referred to here)
stated that a local authority should not “intentionally promote homosexuality or
publish material with the intention of promoting homosexuality” or “promote the
teaching in any maintained school of the acceptability of homosexuality as a
pretended family relationship”. It was repealed in Scotland in June 2000, and in
England and Wales in September 2003.
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Table I: Breakdown of Focus Group Sample
Pseudonym Sex Agea Ethnicity Sexuality Student
Statusb
Subject Major
Group 1: Adam
Bryan
Chris
M
M
M
2
2
2
white
white
white
Heterosexual
Heterosexual
Heterosexual
PG
PG
RA
Sports Science
Sports Science
Sports Science
Group 2: Diana
Emma
Fiona
F
F
F
1
1
1
white
white
white
Heterosexual
Heterosexual
Heterosexual
UG
UG
UG
Psychology
Psychology
Psychology
Group 3: Imogen
Jessica
Heather
F
F
F
1
1
2
white
white
white
Heterosexual
Heterosexual
Heterosexual
UG
UG
UG
Psychology
Psychology
Psychology
Group 4: Gavin
Melissa
Katherine
Leanne
M
F
F
F
1
1
2
1
white
white
white
white
Heterosexual
Heterosexual
Bisexual
Lesbian
UG
UG
PG/UG
UG
Electronics
Physics
Art/Design
Ergonomics
Group 5: Pam
Rita
F
F
2
1
white
white
Heterosexual
Heterosexual
UG
UG
Social Policy
Social Policy
Group 6: Wendy
Robert
Tim
F
M
M
2
1
1
white
white
white
Lesbian
Gay
Gay
UG
UG
UG
Psychology
Art/Design
Physics + Maths
a: 1 = 18-21; 2 = 25+ b: UG = undergraduate; PG = postgraduate; RA = research assistant
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Appendix: Focus group schedule topics and questions
Topic Key Question & Probes
Freedom of Expression Many lesbian and gay couples are afraid of holding hands, hugging, or
kissing in public through fear of reprisal. What do you think about this?
• Are there situations in which you think this is not okay?
• Are there particular types of behaviours that you think are not
okay?
Same-sex Marriage What do you think about same-sex marriage?
• Do you think that lesbian and gay couples should be able to get
married? Why/why not?
• What if they want to make a public affirmation of their love for
religious or other reasons?
• What if a lesbian or gay man is in a committed relationship with
a partner who is not British?
Lesbian and Gay
Parenting
What do you think about lesbian and gay couples parenting children?
• What if they have children from a previous heterosexual
relationship?
• What if a lesbian couple wanted to have their own (biological)
child? What if they wanted to use alternative insemination at a
clinic?
• What about adopting or fostering a child?
Lesbian and Gay Issues
in Education
What do you think about lesbian and gay issues being discussed in
schools?
• Are there any situations when you would consider that this is not
okay? What about in sexuality education? History or Social
Studies?
• What do you think about lesbian and gay guest speakers talking
in schools about being lesbian or gay?
• Do you think that books presenting lesbianism and male
homosexuality as a positive lifestyle should be made available in
school libraries?
Employment issues You may or may not know that there is currently a ban in this country on
lesbians and gay men serving in the armed forces. The papers say that
the government is soon to lift this ban. What do you think about this?
• Do you think that there are any jobs that should not be open to
lesbians and gay men?
• What do you think about people losing their jobs or being fired
because they’re lesbian or gay?
• Did you know that a lesbian and gay employee is not entitled to
work related benefits (e.g. travel, pensions) for his/her partner,
but heterosexual couples usually are? What do you think about
this?
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Age of Consent for Sex You may have heard that the British government is currently attempting
to reduce the age of consent for sex between men from 18 to 16. What
do you think about this?
• Are there any circumstances under which you think the age of
consent for homosexual sex should not be 16?
• Do you think that the age of consent for homosexual sex should
be the same as that for heterosexual sex? Why/why not?
State Sanctioned
Violence
In some countries, lesbians and gay men are imprisoned, tortured, or
even killed simply for being lesbian or gay. What do you think about
this?
• Are there any situations in which you think this is justified?
• What do you think about lesbians and gay men seeking asylum
on grounds of sexual orientation based persecution?
Human Rights Have you heard of the phrase ‘human rights’? Do you have any idea
what it means?
• Do you think it might be relevant to thinking about lesbian and
gay issues? Why/why not?
